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CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY

BY

GEORGE F. KENNAN

The National War College
Washington 25, D. C.
17 September 1948
MR. DURBROW: In trying to think of what I should say today to introduce our speaker, I find myself in quite a quandary. When I left here two years ago I knew him by one name, but when I returned I discovered he had another name. However, when I saw him down in the Admiral's office this morning I found it is the same person. So I had my own quandary somewhat resolved.

I have served with him in many posts, and I have known him very well for a number of years. So I discovered Mr. X is the same man I knew before when I left for Moscow about two years ago. He has served, as everybody knows, in Moscow and Germany and various other posts in Europe. He is now in the policy branch of the State Department, and he is going to give us a talk which I think we will all enjoy tremendously. Mr. Kennan.

MR. KENNAN: Admiral Hill, gentlemen: I think there is something a little absurd about someone who once had the job of Deputy for Foreign Affairs in this institution coming down to talk to you from a position such as I have now got in the State Department, because it really seems to me that anyone who once had this job and who is dumb enough to let himself get talked into the job up there hasn't anything worth the War College's listening to. You ought to bear that in mind in the future if you see Durbrow showing up here.

The last few weeks, as you can imagine, have been really hectic ones at the State Department, particularly for all of us who have had anything to do with the Berlin situation. I have not had as much to do with it as others have, so I have only had a sort of a taste of what the others have been through. I am sure there has never been in the history of our country any set of negotiations that has been as difficult in the straight intellectual sense but also as tiring in the physical sense as these long discussions in Moscow and Berlin about the restrictions which the Russians have placed on transport. There have been teleconversations. They have gone on so long over there that there was one instance, I believe, where the name of one gentleman was on our side of the screen when the conversation began and
when it was resumed the next morning--it went on until 2 A.M.--he was in London on the other side. The thing has just been night and day, and the differences of time have made their mark on it. Either the people in London or ourselves have always been talking in the middle of the night. That is really the most arduous time I have ever seen in the Department.

We all have to make our sacrifices as a result of that. Ours have been a certain amount of loss of sleep and time, and the sacrifice you make is that instead of the dubious privilege of hearing a prepared speech at this stage of the game by the director of the Policy Planning Staff, you will get in large measure such rumination as he was able to encompass in the course of shaving this morning.

The title of this lecture was simply "Contemporary Problems of Foreign Policy". That can mean anything, and it can be approached from very far or from very near. We will have time in the question period, perhaps, to approach it from the near side, and I thought it might be more useful this morning if I would start out by trying to put before you a concept of the national security of this country. I say "a concept", because I put it forward as a basis for discussion. There could be others. Then I will let you know how in my mind the events which are the subject of the headlines in today's papers fit in with it.

The historian Gibbon, whom people tease me about liking to quote--and I have to admit that I do--when he had completed in the span of about two and a half thousand pages the history of "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" in the West and was about to turn to the history of the Roman empire in the East, took time out for a page or two to examine the question of whether the same things which caused the decline of Rome could not really affect the civilization of Western Europe of his day. And he pointed out that Rome had not really declined--at least he didn't think so--as a result of internal troubles; that it had been pushed over, so to speak, by what he called "savage nations of the globe," who were "the common enemies of civilized society." "And we may inquire," he said, "with anxious curiosity, whether Europe is still threatened with a repetition of those calamities, which formerly oppressed the arms and institutions of Rome."
And, having put the question in this way, Gibbon came to a reassuring conclusion about it. He didn't think there was very much chance that the same sort of thing could happen in Europe that had happened to Rome, and the reasons he gave were these: "Europe is now divided into twelve powerful, though unequal kingdoms, three respectable commonwealths, and a variety of smaller, though independent, states; the chances of royal and ministerial talents are multiplied, at least, with the number of its rulers; and a Julian, or Semiramis"—by that he meant the powerful, aggressive dictators—"may reign in the North, while Arcadius and Honorius"—the peace-loving ones—"again slumber on the thrones of the South." Again he was pointing out the diversity of Europe and the improbability that anyone could come to control the whole place. "The abuses of tyranny are restrained by the mutual influence of fear and shame; republics have acquired order and stability; monarchies have imbibed the principles of freedom, or, at least, of moderation; and some sense of honor and justice is introduced into the most defective constitutions by the general manners of the times. In peace, the progress of knowledge and industry is accelerated by the emulation of so many active rivals;"—in other words, he was pointing out the diversity in the Continent in the balance of power—"in war, the European forces are exercised by temperate and undecisive contests."—in other words, no total wars in this Europe I know. And then he said, and I ask you to note this: "If a savage conqueror should issue from the deserts of Tartary," by which he meant Central Asia, and in this connection you can think today of the power of the Kremlin and the MKVD, "he must repeatedly vanquish"—he meant successively vanquish—"the robust peasants of Russia, the numerous armies of Germany, the gallant nobles of France, and the intrepid freemen of Britain; who, perhaps might confederate for their common defence. Should the victorious Barbarians carry slavery and desolation as far as the Atlantic Ocean, ten thousand vessels would transport beyond their pursuit the remains of civilized society; and Europe would revive and flourish in the American world, which is already filled with her colonies and institutions."

That was the problem of security in the western Europe of the 18th Century which Gibbon knew, and I would like to submit that that is basically the problem of security which this country now faces. We did not face it fifty years ago, for reasons which I will explain.
We do face it today; and I would like to put forward certain of the considerations which lead me to believe that is the basic problem of our security.

There are, I believe, only five centers of industrial and military power in the world which are important to us from the standpoint of national security. And they all lie around the north temperate belt of the earth's surface. Our own, of course, is one. And excluding that, we find the other four are all either on the Eurasian land mass or just off of it.

This is bound to be an oversimplification, as are all such judgments. What I am trying to get at is the heart of the problem here, and I will concede to you that you can argue about the details of it. In other words, you can rule out Africa and South America and Australia and the other islands aside from these two centers (Great Britain and Japan), from the standpoint of the key problems of United States national security. From the standpoint of foreign policy we have great and important problems affecting South America, affecting Africa and affecting these other portions of the globe; but they are secondary from the standpoint of national security, because there is no possibility, as I see it, in either of those other continents or elsewhere in the globe that you would get the requisite conditions of climate, of industrial strength, of population and of tradition which would enable people there to develop and launch the type of amphibious power which would have to be launched if our national security were seriously affected.

That brings it down to four power centers, then: that of the British Isles; that of Europe, the center of which is in Germany and Central Europe; that of Russia, with the growing industrial-military strength of that area; and finally that of Japan. And I think today fortunately we are able to rule out Japan as a threat to national security. Some day we are going to have to deal with it very seriously; but today we have it in our hands, and it is at least not one of our major dangers. Great Britain has never been one of those dangers, and I am absolutely confident will never be. I think it is the one area in the world outside our own continent with which we are really bound by realizations on the part of the people there and the realizations on the part of our own people, which are far stronger than any alliance and on which we can place our trust.
Therefore, we find our problem reduced to two centers of power (which is the way I would like to refer to them): the one of Central Europe, and the other, Russia. And I would like to examine briefly why it is that our security is threatened today by this relationship between these two centers of power when it wasn't forty years ago, or when people didn't think it was forty years ago.

After all, at the outbreak of World War I, people in this country could look back on a solid century during which there had been absolutely no serious threat to the security of the United States from outside forces. Even the French intervention in Mexico in the middle of the century I don't think could have been called such a serious threat.

It occurred to me, when I was thinking about this lecture, to inquire why it was that so suddenly, in a span of less than forty years, the situation has changed from one which appeared to be one of complete security, in fact, increasing security as our industrial might grew, to one which is of extreme insecurity. What is it that has occurred in the world which makes us now feel insecure in the face of what is going on over here, whereas as little as thirty-five or forty years ago, when we were boys, we had a sense of complete security?

I think the answer to that, the answer to the question of why the Eurasian land mass is a threat to us today when it wasn't then, really lies in the development of modern techniques and particularly modern weapons.

Now I mean that, of course, in the straight military sense, because with modern weapons, as we have seen, it is possible to conduct campaigns of appreciably greater scope and possibilities, although not so much greater. But there is a significance there as between the present and a hundred years ago.

Napoleon's campaigns, of course, reaching as they did down to Egypt and way into Russia, were of tremendous scope, but still I think I am right—and you people can correct me if I am not—that modern weapons have made it possible for a single military strength to have plausible hopes of extending its military control through actual aggressive action over a wider area than would have been the case in the past, and bringing us in that way closer to the day
when one center of military power might hope to control both our power centers, namely those of both Russia and of Europe.

But I think there has been another development arising from the improvement of weapons, from the advance in modern techniques, which has been even more important than that of the straight military advances which we are accustomed to think of, and that has been the advance in the development and the use of police weapons. I can't tell you how important that has become to many people in Europe, and how little relatively it has been noticed over here in our own country. What I am driving at is the fact that in the days of Napoleon the spirit and political sentiment of a subject population were a very serious problem to the people who had to run it. In those days people still could stage a serious revolt with local forces and with local weapons. There was a time when you could do it with pitchforks and cudgels. That day has passed now. The development of the machine gun, the development of the tank, the development of the airplane, above all the development of modern means of communication, of the telephone, the automobile, the railroad, all those things have made it infinitely harder than it was a hundred years ago for people to conspire against a central political power which is ruthless and which is determined to hold them down, and they have given a great edge to the fellow who has the cruelty and the courage and the determination to seize and hold onto those police weapons.

We saw that during World War II when the Germans, after all, were able to hold great parts of the continent, although they were under very severe stress of war themselves. Nevertheless their police methods were adequate to hold in subjection such countries as Norway, with a very vigorous, daring population, thoroughly stirred up against them. All over the continent it was the same thing; people could not revolt against modern police weapons effectively used. That is a fact of very great significance from the standpoint of our security, because it means that not only is the day approaching when it will be militarily possible for one group of people, one political power perhaps, to seize militarily the two centers of power on the Eurasian land mass, but when it will be possible in a police sense for one totalitarian regime not only to seize them but to hold them.

Fortunately there are limits to that possibility of their holding them. They are the limits of human nature
itself. They are the limits imposed by the strain which such a great and complicated task of governing places on the relations between a few men within a political organization. And I am still in hopes that we will find that nobody has been quite big enough, quite enough of a ruler, to encompass that task. I think actually that Hitler's regime would have disintegrated fairly rapidly if he had won the war and had spread out all over this area. I think it would have disintegrated as a result of the corrupting influence of the people he would have had to appoint to run these countries. It would have become too far-flung and it wouldn't have worked. I think the Soviet Government, if it were to have been successful in seizing politically the remainder of Europe and in penetrating, as it hoped, the Near East and other parts of Asia, also would have been subject to disintegration.

You may ask then "Why didn't we simply permit this to happen?" The answer is: before that disintegration occurred and became complete so much damage would have been done that it would have been really detrimental to our national interests, and we would have been taking a great chance; for the moment both of these centers come under one great control, even if that lasts only a few years, there would be the possibility of mobilization and employment of such tremendous economic and military strength from that side as to constitute a real threat to the security of the North American continent. And that is over and above the danger of guided missiles and long distance bombardment. In any case you have to fall back on something like an instinctive feeling, and that is this: that our only real friends in the world—and by friends I am not speaking in the sentimental sense, I am speaking of people who have a clear, visible stake in our own prosperity and our own security—are the ones who lie around the rim of the North Atlantic Ocean. And whenever these two power centers fall into the hands of one people, and those people are one political grouping, I am sure those Atlantic nations will be done for, and we will not be able to protect them effectively.

Now let us have a brief look at how the relationships between those two power centers have developed within our lifetime. In World War I what we were faced with was not originally a conflict between the two. It was a contest for power that developed mostly within Central Europe, and which developed (rather than began) into an effort by the Germans to break out and to become the rivals or
probably the superiors of England in sea power, in colonial power and in influence throughout the Continent. In seeking to do that, though, the Germans were already faced with the fact that the power of Russia, while not yet developed as it is today, was still such that they did not dare leave it alone, and they were forced to fight throughout that whole World War I what was in reality a holding action in the East because they could not accomplish their purposes in the West unless they could hold this eastern force. That is a reality which has run all the way through European history, and one that is well worth bearing in mind.

That struggle, as you know, developed into a deadlock, and we finally intervened and settled the issue in favor of the Western Allies. We did so, I think, not because we were yet aware of any of these dangers I have been talking about of the domination of the Eurasian land mass; we did so because we were instinctively afraid of anything that was going to smash the power of Britain, and because we objected to German methods almost more than we objected to what they were trying to do. If it had not been for the submarine campaign and the violation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium, I doubt that we would have intervened. But having intervened, we were faced when the time came for the peace settlement with the first real test of our thinking about what was going to happen in Europe and in Asia. And I must say that I think, looking back on it, that that was one test we failed very miserably. We contributed nothing realistic to the thinking which went into the peace settlement. We took refuge in a plan of universal world organization which was admittedly designed not to solve but to be an excuse for solving the real problems of Western Europe. We left it to the others to make a peace, which was an extremely bad peace and made no sense really from the standpoint of the war we had just fought because it broke up every other great concentration of power around Germany. The Russian power was already broken up through internal conflict. The peace broke up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was the only other great state in Western Europe. It left Germany alone as the only really powerful modern state in Europe, surrounded with a lot of weaker states of whom the strongest was France. But even France was considerably weaker, and it constituted in that way an invitation to German aggression, an invitation which was noted by astute political observers of the times.

I would really recommend strongly, if any of you want to get a broader view of Europe, that you go back to the
books of the famous French historian, Jacques Bainville, written in the 1920's, which predicted with mechanical accuracy what the Germans would do. Bainville said: You watch, this is inevitable. This peace, he said, is too mild for the hardships it contains. He said: It is going to annoy the Germans without breaking them. A powerful nationalistic movement is going to arise in Germany. The Germans are going to find themselves surrounded only with little, new democracies who will be inexperienced in government, and who will be meat for divisive tactics. He said: They will pick them off one by one, and that Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland would be the first to go.

Now all that happened. You had this rather terrible occurrence of the emergence in Germany of national socialism and of its bid to dominate this western center of power of which I have spoken. In the long-term sense of the establishment of a balance between East and West you can say "Why did we intervene? Why didn't we permit the western center of power to be strengthened by anybody who wanted to strengthen it? Wouldn't it have been wiser in the light of what we know today not to smash the growth of centralized power in Western Europe, but to permit it to go on?" The only answer to that, gentlemen, is that it might have been true if, instead of the Nazis, we had had anything resembling a reasonable and responsible group of people in Germany. There was a great deal in Hitler's so-called new order which would have made sense if the guiding spirit behind it had not been Hitler. But we had to recognize that this was a force which was trying to seize Western Europe, although it emerged from inside Western Europe. It was a force which was utterly impossible, a force with which we could never have lived at peace, a force which if successful could have come to dominate the eastern power center, too. To have mobilized those two forces together in this way would have been just about as dangerous to us, perhaps not quite, as though it had been the other way around and the Russians had come into possession of the West. Therefore, we were forced in a way to turn our backs on what was one of the two dangers, Russia, and to concentrate on trying to keep the power of this western center from falling into the hands of a group of people, themselves westerners, who were clearly not fit to exercise it and could in the end have achieved nothing but destruction, bewilderment, confusion and weakness in Western Europe.
The tragedy of this last world war, from the standpoint of ourselves and the western nations—not only a tragedy but a reality which we all ought to face absolutely squarely—is that we had let ourselves get just a little bit too weak, and that we were not strong enough to take on, or at least to adopt a rational attitude toward, both of these power centers at once. We had to use this one, Russia, in order to settle this one, Germany. We had to use it although the use of it placed it in a position far more favorable than it ever should have been placed in. We had to use it although we should have known that it was devoted and consecrated to our own destruction. We had to use it nevertheless. You can argue whether we had to use it the way we did, whether we had to give it the moral pats on the back we did, whether we had to set it up with our own people in the light in which we set it up; but the fact of the matter is that we were not powerful enough to take on both power centers at the same time, which would have been the rational thing to do; we had to use the one to defeat the other; and having used the one, we found ourselves at the end of this war with a hell of a problem on our hands to know how to deal with it. The outcome of the war—I merely want to point out its significance from the standpoint of what I am talking about here—was that while we had dealt at least militarily with this ugly and vicious bid that arose from Germany for the domination of the Continent, in doing so we had brought this center of power (Russia) into the heart of Europe which enabled it to control part of the power of the West, and we had installed it in positions which in the minds of the people in Moscow gave it the capability of overrunning politically and extending its police control to the rest of Western Europe and achieving the one thing which I think is really a major danger to our national security, and that is the union of Russian power, of Russian manpower and Russian resources, with the technical skills and the advanced industries of Western Europe.

There is the basis, there is the background of our foreign policy problems of the postwar era. And I think that that is about all there is to them.

There is one digression I want to make before I go on from there. The Visual Aid people have prepared very considerable charts to illustrate this. I thought it would be worthwhile not just for this lecture but that it would be a good thing for the War College to have them for the future. You may ask: "Why, when you speak of two power centers which are dangerous to our national security, do
you rule out all of eastern and southeastern Asia and what do you say about it?" I think the answer to that is that this area, this tremendous bewildering, seething area which is in a state of high political instability, is indeed a tremendous problem for United States foreign policy, perhaps the most perplexing that we have and the one for which we are least prepared. We have the fewest people who know anything about it, the greatest differences of opinion about what we ought to do. But I cannot see that it is or can become a real threat to our security. By that I am not saying that communist power cannot be extended into the masses of China, or that communist forces cannot seize at least temporarily some of the islands in the area of the East Indies. But I insist the security of our country can be seriously threatened only when you get those combinations of industrial power and human skills and manpower and human vigor and climate (which is a part of human vigor) which would enable people to set up and equip modern armies and to develop amphibious strength which they could launch in the direction of our country. I do not see any of that coming in southeastern Asia. Even if all of China falls into communist hands, which I think is almost fantastic because it is too enormous for anybody to get that type of control, but even if it were to happen, I do not see that China could be developed in that way.

Again I put this forward to you as a thesis of thought on which I am, goodness knows, still open to conviction. I put it forward as a question for thought and discussion among you, rather than as something which I ask you to believe. But China does not have the resources which would enable it to develop that sort of power, and it does have other things which would interfere with such development.

I have had these charts sent down, which I thought I would show to you in that respect; because I know you always get an argument on this question, and I think I might as well deal with it. You have here four things: You have the United States, Western Europe, the U.S.S.R. and China. In other words you have our own power center and you have here the European one. Here you have the Eastern one which I have been talking about, and here the other which I am trying to explain does not need really to be taken into account as a major factor in national security. I ask you merely to look at these things.

You have over here the indices of industrial potential. Here is the coal, here the iron ore reserves, here are the
petroleum reserves. Here is the cultivated land per capita—that has a significance that it is per capita. Here is the thermal installed capacity, the hydro installed capacity. Here you get into actual industrial out put. There is the coal in China as compared with the others. Here is the iron ore, the railway mileage, the petroleum. You will note there that Western Europe is about as poor in petroleum, and that is where the Middle East has to come in. There is the pig iron. There are the ton miles. I think all you have to do is glance at that and see why it is I am inclined to dismiss Southeast Asia and China as a major threat to the United States security, and why it is that I draw a strong distinction between what you see here and what you see here in every other instance.

I don't mean by this that all this Russian potential is necessarily going to be actually developed against us, but I think that it is a far more serious potential than what you get in China. I think that if you were to look at Southeast Asia you would find that it is long on the resources and very low on the out put, but that there, again, climatic conditions, conditions of the stage of the development of the peoples, make it very unlikely that we will have to face any serious problem from that angle.

To return to Europe and Russia, you have seen what all this has meant. This power center, Russia, has been moved up into the center of Europe, has almost acquired the possibility of overrunning the rest of Europe by political means if not by military means (actually by both since our military retirement). The problem of foreign policy since the war has been a dual one. You have seen it in the development of what I have been talking about. There have been two problems all along for use in the relationships between these two power centers: the first has been to prevent either of them from dominating the whole; and the second has been to see that the power center of Western Europe is in the hands of people who can be looked to to bear that power, to administer that power, with some sense of moderation, of decency and responsibility. That dual problem has run all through the problem of our foreign policy since the war.

What we have been trying to do for that reason is really three things. First we have tried to stop the political advance of Russian power into Western Europe, and I think we have been successful in doing that.
Secondly, we have tried to devise our policies in such a way as to bring about the eventual maneuvering of this Russian policy, by means short of war, back into the area in which it belongs, that is, to get it out of Central Europe, get its grip released on this eastern sector of the European power potential and get that again attached to Western Europe. The third element of our policy is: having done that, and even while we are trying to do it, to see to it then that the real control over the power center of Western Europe does not again slip into the hands of people like the Nazis who are impossible, who would have no regard for our own friends or the security of the Atlantic area, and who would make fatal mistakes.

I am not going to try to sum up here in any detail how far we have gotten with that. We are very well satisfied with the result of our efforts to keep this area from succumbing politically. We do not think the Russians, since the termination of the war, have had any serious intention of resorting to arms at this time in order to overrun this area. We believe it would not suit their purposes to do that. It would give them more responsibility than they want; it would call for a military effort at a much too early moment from the standpoint of their own reconstruction; and it would also amount in a certain way to a confession of political failure which they are unwilling to make. They have considered there is every reason why they should be able to do this job politically and not militarily.

As for the maneuvering of Russian power back into the Russian border, that is the task which we are facing immediately at this moment, and it is an extremely delicate one. I am not sure whether we are going to get away with it by means short of war or not. We are having success, as the Tito affair has shown, in disrupting the morale and the integrity of the satellite area. But that has produced a curious result which perhaps none of us had anticipated. I don't know how it is in military affairs, and whether this same rule holds there—perhaps it does—but I can tell you that in political affairs, and particularly in the type of political game the Russians play, you can stand a deep salient into your own lines if you are on the advance, but if you are on the defensive you have to wipe out salients.

Now we have thrust the Russians on the defensive throughout Eastern Europe, and the only real salient we
had into their lines was Berlin, deep in the Russian zone. The result of their going over to the defensive has been that they have said to themselves: come what may, now, we have to get these Americans and French and British out of Berlin or get their pressure reduced on us in Germany in one way or another. If we are going to be on the defensive, let's be really on the defensive; let us get these fellows out and let us clamp down on the Soviet zone of Germany and get an absolutely tight hold on it.

The more the satellite area disintegrates, the more fellows like Tito there are and the more fellows like Gomulka; the more the Russians see the writing on the wall and the more they tend to hold on to this and to that. And the only military pawn in Germany is getting us out of Berlin. So I can see that in the process of trying to maneuver them back we have come to a very delicate point. They are not so dumb, and they realize what is going to happen to them once that process sets in. I think they think their own weakness is such they do not dare yield on any of these things, that if they once again yield there will be a general disintegration of their prestige and power, and that will go right into their own homeland and affect their own internal security in the Kremlin, and they cannot permit it.

I don't know what else we can do than what we are doing. That is a risk that we have to take. If they are so weak that they cannot yield and have to stay and fight it out rather than adjust themselves to pressure from the West, there is nothing we can do about that anyway, and there is no point in our trying to solve it. We have to take that risk, because we must get them out. We cannot settle for their remaining there indefinitely.

That leaves the third of those problems I mentioned, and that is to see that even if we do get the Russians back out of Eastern Europe, the power of Western Europe is in hands which we can tolerate and in which we can have some confidence. That is a task which seems to me more and more difficult with every day that goes by. It is, of course, essentially the problem of the Germans, and of what we do with the Germans. We have hoped in these years that have gone by since the war that with Germany knocked out, with only a vacuum here, we would find some other forces in Western Europe which would rise up in a peaceful way and propose not the domination of Western Europe by themselves but the domination of Western Europe, let
us say, by a confederation of decent countries in Western Europe, and that that confederation or union, or whatever you want to call it, would be powerful enough to absorb the problem of Germany within it and to find means of using the Germans and employing their skills and their power to the benefit of Western Europe without permitting them to take over once more. Unless our friends find such a solution over there, I must say I do not know what the answer can be in Western Europe.

So far we have not gotten on very far in that respect. I am not saying that it is all the fault of other people, but I do think our main obstacles seem to be in the attitudes we encounter with the other Western European countries. We run into one difficulty in the extreme sense of military insecurity which these countries have, especially the French, the Benelux and to some extent the British. It is understandable and at the same time it is really a mistake. It is that sense of insecurity which makes them really reluctant to go ahead with many of the things they ought to go ahead with; and they turn to us, when we press them to do those things, and they say: "Oh, it is very easy for you to talk. You are strong and sleek and fat and you are three thousand miles away, and you can do this backseat driving perfectly safely, but it is a different thing for us up here." For that reason they have a tendency to take these problems of Western Union rather in the light of: what guarantees can we get from the United States? than of: what can we actually do to unify this area and settle the problem of Germany?

They also shun what I think is their real responsibility: to find the answer to what we do with these tens of millions of Germans whom we have in the middle of Central Europe. I am not going into that problem in detail. We run up against it time after time, more and more as time goes on. In these discussions about Berlin we have come up against it in very, very bitter form; and there have been times when we have had to ask ourselves this question: After all, this is a matter of vital importance. Is it better that we do alone what we think is right or that we do in company with others what we think is wrong and against, perhaps, all our own instincts and our desires? We have faced that question more than once and we have come to the conclusion that come what may, we simply must hold with the French and the British, better to hold with them even though they are wrong rather than step apart with them if we are right, because if we let disunity creep in we may have lost the whole battle anyway.
There I think is perhaps our worst problem of foreign policy today. I don't know which is worse--this task, or maneuvering the Russians back. In a sense, the latter is easier; because we all know now these are our enemies and it is very simple to deal with an enemy, basically--simpler than dealing with a friend. But the former is something we have not found the answer to, and it worries me very much, it worries all of us. We have spent the last three weeks trying to figure out the position of this country with respect to Germany, and at every turn we find this terrible dilemma that what appears to be the sensible thing to do about Germany is the thing our own Allies are most reluctant to do. We then are before the choice of whether we should do things which we think in the long run will undermine the power of Western Europe or things which would cause us to depart from the company of our Allies.

Here is our basic dilemma at this present moment. The requirements of our own security demand the strengthening of Western Europe, or rather of Europe itself, in relation to the power of the East at any cost. You would think in that effort we would have no more enthusiastic collaborators than the peoples of Western Europe, but they are still under the shock of the recent conflict. They are not yet ready to assume the military risks that they feel attendant on correct policies in Western Europe, on a firm resistance to Russia's political pressures, and they are still afflicted with such a horror and loathing of the Germans that they are unable to approach them as human beings and find the political means to make their strength a part of the strength of Europe.

There is a lot still that we can do ourselves to get around this problem. Our own psychological approach to the peoples of Western Europe, even to our own Allies, is still rudimentary. We haven't developed it at all. Our whole political warfare concepts are hardly developed. We could do far more than we do to convince the French that we are the sort of people we are and not the sort of people they think us to be. We could do a great deal to strengthen their sense of security by getting to them such arms as we can get over to them, and by concluding some sort of a military alliance with them. I think both of those solutions are really not entirely rational ones; but what we are dealing with are not entirely rational feelings, and they probably would both be helpful for that reason.
INDICES OF INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL FOR SELECTED AREAS

- U.S.
- WESTERN EUROPE CEE C PLUS WESTERN GERMANY
- U.S.S.R.
- CHINA (INCLUDING MANCHURIA AND FORMOSA)

**COAL RESERVES**
(BILLION M.T.)

**IRON ORE RESERVES**
(BILLION M.T.)

**PETROLEUM RESERVES**
(BILLION BBLs.)

**ELECTRIC POWER**

**HYDRO INSTALLED CAPACITY** (000kW)

**THERMAL INSTALLED CAPACITY** (000kW)

**CULTIVATED LAND PER CAPITA** (ACRES)
In the long run, though, I think we have to bear with them and to keep them on our side almost at any cost; because if the day ever comes when we have to despair of working with them for a rational solution in Western Europe, we will then be up against problems that I personally shudder to think of. I have a feeling that if that day ever came we would have to become for the first time, I think, in our whole history completely cynical in the conduct of our foreign policy. Whatever else may be charged against us, we have never been that in the past, and I hope we never have to become that way, because if we do, I think there is a close connection between foreign policy and internal policy, and a change in one cannot take place without a change in the other. I have a feeling if we ever get to the point where we cease thinking of whole groups of countries in the world as our friends, and where we cease having ideals in the field of foreign policy, something very valuable will have gone out of our internal political life for better or worse and will have moved irrevocably into the past like some of the old institutions of American life like the general store and the five-cent cigar, and we will never see it again.

So a great deal depends not only internally but externally on what we are able to accomplish in the coming months and in the next year. This time we have to contribute to Western Europe not just guns and men and planes, but actually political understanding and skill on a scale that we have never dreamed of in the past. We have got to bind our friends to us with the proverbial Shakespeare's hoop of steel. We have to nurse our recent enemies, the Germans, back to economic strength without instigating them to renewed aggression or making them the masters of our recent allies, and with the help of both of them, our recent allies and recent enemies—because it cannot be done with just one or the other—we have to maneuver this Russian bear back into his cage and keep him there where he belongs. Thank you.
INDICES OF PEAK INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT FOR SELECTED AREAS

- U.S.
- WESTERN EUROPE
- CEEC PLUS WESTERN GERMANY
- U.S.S.R.
- CHINA (INCLUDING MANCHURIA AND FORMOSA)

**COAL (MILLION M.T.)**

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**IRON ORE** (MILLION M.T.)

---

**PIG IRON** (MILLION M.T.)

---

**INGOT STEEL** (MILLION M.T.)

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**PETROLEUM** (MILLION BBLS)

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**TOTAL THERMAL & HYDRO POWER PRODUCTION** (BILLION K.W.H.)

---

**RAILROAD MILEAGE** (THOUS.)

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**TON-MILES FREIGHT** (BILLION M.T.)

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*YEARS IN WHICH PEAK OUTPUT WAS ACHIEVED VARY BY COUNTRIES AND COMMODITIES. DATA ARE NOT GENERALLY INDICATIVE OF PRESENT PRODUCTION.*

**TOTAL ORE MINED WITHOUT REGARD FOR Fe CONTENT**